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Abstract 
This paper explores econometric and theoretical interpretations for the relatively high 
demand for international reserves by countries in the Far East and the relatively low demand by 
some other developing countries.  Using a sample of about 125 developing countries, we show 
that reserve holdings over the 1980-1996 period seem to be the predictable outcome of a few key 
factors, such as the size of international transactions, their volatility, the exchange-rate 
arrangement, and political considerations. The estimating equation also does a good job of 
predicting reserve holdings in Asia before the 1997 financial crisis. After the crisis, the 
estimating equation significantly under-predicts the reserve holdings of several key Far East 
countries, as one might expect from the Lucas Critique.  This under-prediction is consistent with 
models explaining the demand for international reserves by developing countries.  Specifically, 
we show that sovereign risk and costly tax collection to cover fiscal liabilities lead to a relatively 
large demand for international reserves.  In the aftermath of a crisis, countries that have to deal 
with higher perceived sovereign risk and higher fiscal liabilities (both funded and unfunded) will 
opt to increase their demand for reserves. The models also help us understand why some 
developing countries do not hold large precautionary reserve balances in the aftermath of crises. 
Countries with high discount rates, political instability or political corruption find it optimal to 
hold much smaller precautionary balances. We also show that models that incorporate loss 
aversion predict a relatively large demand for international reserves.  Hence, if a crisis increases 
the volatility of shocks and/or loss aversion, it will greatly increase in the demand for 
international reserves.  Consequently, we conclude that the ‘puzzling’ pattern in international 
reserve holdings is reasonably explained by the extended models described in this paper. 
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Introduction 
In the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis, emerging markets in the Far East have built 
up large stockpiles of international reserves.  Today, China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, South Korea 
and Singapore rank just behind Japan as the world’s biggest holders of international reserves.  
These five Asian emerging markets together hold reserves totaling nearly US$700 billion.  
There is a growing debate about the need to hold so many reserves.  Some critics point 
out that holding a lot of reserves is costly.  Reserves held in dollar-denominated Treasuries, for 
example, earn a modest return, far below the government’s own cost of borrowing either in local 
currency or in dollars.  Why hold cash in the bank and pay high interest on outstanding 
liabilities?  Critics also note that the yield on reserves is much lower than the opportunity cost of 
those reserves as measured by the potential return on real investments in the economy. 
Those who support large reserve balances argue that the cost of holding reserves is small 
relative to the economic consequences of a crisis.  Large stockpiles are needed to forestall-- or at 
least weather-- currency and financial crises that are increasingly frequent and severe in today’s 
international monetary system.  Moreover, just when an emerging market most needs reserves -- 
in a crisis -- it can be shut out of the international capital markets because of sovereign risk 
concerns.  An IMF bailout is not guaranteed, and even when forthcoming, comes with strict 
conditions.  Holding large reserve stockpiles is therefore prudent policy.
1 
In this paper, we examine some of the factors that influence the decision to hold 
international reserves in developing countries.  We also explore why these holdings are 
                                                 
1 In addition, international reserves have traditionally been used to manage fixed exchange rates.  
Even though a number of countries have moved to more flexible exchange-rate arrangements in 
the 1990s, some studies suggest that emerging markets still hold large reserve stockpiles to limit 
exchange-rate volatility, particularly when they have large external liabilities denominated in 
foreign currency.  (Hausmann, et al, 2000; Calvo and Reinhart, 2002). 
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particularly large in the Far East.  We begin with a standard estimating equation that does quite 
well in predicting central bank reserve holdings through 1996.  For a sample of about 125 
developing countries, reserve holdings seem to be the predictable outcome of a few key factors, 
such as the size of international transactions, their volatility, the exchange-rate arrangement, and 
political considerations.  The estimating equation also does a good job in predicting reserve 
holdings in Asia.  If anything, it over-predicts reserve holdings for some emerging markets in the 
Far East over the 1980-1996 period.  After the 1997 Asian financial crisis, however, the 
estimating equation significantly under-predicts the reserve holdings of key Far Eastern 
countries.   
We suggest that the under-prediction may be due to changes in the stochastic 
environment faced by these countries.  After the crisis, they had to deal with higher perceived 
sovereign risk and higher fiscal liabilities, both funded and unfunded.  In addition, the economic 
damage that followed the crisis made them much more loss-averse.  We present models that 
incorporate sovereign risk, costly tax collection to cover fiscal liabilities, and loss aversion.  We 
show that these factors can lead to large precautionary reserve holdings.  The models also help us 
understand why some developing countries do not hold large precautionary reserve balances in 
the aftermath of last decade’s crises.  Countries with high discount rates, political instability or 
political corruption find it optimal to hold much smaller precautionary balances. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 describes recent trends in reserve 
holdings by developing countries and demonstrates that the emerging markets of the Far East are 
outliers in terms of their sizeable reserve holdings.  Section 3 presents a standard estimating 
equation that does a good job of predicting reserve holdings in a panel of developing countries 
over the 1980-1996 period.  However, it fails to capture the tremendous build-up in reserves in 3 
the Far East after the Asian crisis.  In Section 4 we explore some theories that enhance our 
understanding of why emerging markets may want to hold large precautionary reserve balances 
in the aftermath of that crisis. We show that a country with some chance of default, large and 
inelastic government outlays, and costly tax collection will find it optimal to hold a large stock of 
precautionary reserve balances, unless offsetting factors intervene.  These offsetting factors 
include a strong preference for current consumption, political instability and political corruption. 
We also show that an increase in the perceived volatility of shocks or/and in loss aversion makes 
it optimal to hold large precautionary reserve balances, even in the face of a large positive equity 
premium.  Section 5 presents some concluding thoughts. 
 
 
2.  Recent Trends in Reserve Holdings by Developing Countries 
At the end of 1994, global reserves (minus gold) were US$1,254 billion.  As shown in 
Figure 1, half were held by industrial countries and half by developing ones.  Among developing 
countries, Asian economies held the most by far.  Asian economies held 30.5% of global 
reserves, while Western Hemisphere countries held only 8.3%, Middle Eastern countries 5.3%, 
developing Europe 3.6% and Africa 1.9%. 
In the past seven and a half years, global reserves have almost doubled in nominal terms, 
to US$2,223 billion at the end of May, 2002.  Today, developing countries hold the bulk of 
reserves -- 60.4% of the total.  Asian economies hold an even more commanding lead, having 
increased their share of global reserves from 30.5% in 1994 to 38% at the end of May, 2002.  4 
The developing countries in Europe hold the next largest share, but it is much smaller than 
Asia’s, only 7.1% of total reserves.
2 
Figure 2 reveals that today’s biggest reserve holders are all Asian economies.  Japan 
holds more reserves than any other nation, US$411.6 billion at the end of May, 2002.  China is 
second, with US$241.9 billion in reserve holdings.  Next in order come Taiwan (US$139.8 
billion), Hong Kong (US$111.2 billion), South Korea (US$109.6 billion) and Singapore (US$78 
billion). 
Figures 3-7 provide additional details about the reserve holdings of these Asian countries 
(except Japan).
3  In order to get a sense of magnitudes and to facilitate comparisons across 
countries, we have scaled reserve holdings by a number of different measures, such as weeks of 
import cover, GDP, M2, and, when available, total external debt and total short-term external 
debt.  For example, the plots in Figure 3 show that China has increased its reserve holdings since 
1985 regardless of how reserves are scaled.  In terms of weeks of import cover, China’s reserves 
have more than doubled over the 1985-2000 period.  As a share of GDP or of short-term external 
debt, they have quadrupled over this period.  As a share of M2 or total external debt, reserves 
have also increased over the 1985-2000 period, but much more modestly.  China’s reserve 
holdings in the 1997-2000 period have been the largest in its history for all scaling measures 
except M2. 
                                                 
2We focus on reserves minus gold for three reasons. First, there are concerns on how to value 
gold. Second, gold now accounts for less than 3% of global reserve holdings when gold is 
measured at 35 SDRs per ounce.  Third, gold holdings by developing countries are negligible.  
When we include gold and follow the IMF in valuing it at 35 SDRs per ounce, we find that 
developing countries held 48.3% of total reserves in 1994 while Asia held 29.6%.  Developing 
countries held 59.6% of total reserves in May, 2002, and Asia 37.5% of the total. 
 
3 The reasons for Japan’s large reserve holdings are not addressed in this paper, since our 
empirical and theoretical focus will be on the reserve holdings of developing countries. 5 
Hong Kong and South Korea follow the same pattern as China.  Reserves have increased 
over the 1985-2000 period regardless of scaling measure, and the increase has been most 
pronounced in the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis.  For Korea, the recent growth in 
reserves is quite dramatic when reserves are scaled by weeks of imports, GDP or M2.  
Interestingly, reserves relative to total external debt have increased very little.  At the end of 
1999, Korea’s reserves were a little over half its external liabilities, not much different than the 
situation in 1989.  In contrast, China’s reserve holdings matched total external liabilities by the 
end of 1999.
4 
Taiwan and Singapore show a somewhat different pattern.  Both have maintained 
considerable reserve holdings for an extended period of time.  We therefore do not see the big 
build-up in reserve holdings that occurred in other Asian economies following the Asian 
financial crisis. 
The pattern in reserve holdings is striking.  Developing countries, and specifically 
emerging markets in the Far East, are holding an increasing share of global reserves.  The 
world’s top reserve holders are all located in Asia.  Using a number of scaling measures, Asian 






                                                 
4 China’s large and growing stock of international reserves may be due to concerns about the 
solvency of its banking system more than the size of its external debt.  In May, 2002, China’s 
Central Bank Governor said that 25-30% of all bank loans were not being repaid.  The credit-
rating agency Standard & Poor’s estimated that the situation might be twice as bad, with half of 
all loans classifiable as non-performing.  (Wall Street Journal, May 10, 2002.) 6 
3.  Estimating Reserve Holdings – How Well Do We Predict For Asian Economies? 
 
We wish to estimate reserve holdings for a panel of developing countries and examine 
whether the estimation performs well in predicting reserves for the Asian emerging markets both 
in sample and out-of-sample.   
We start with a standard estimating equation, where reserve holdings depend on scale 
factors, international transactions volatility, and openness.  The latter variable is a proxy for the 
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where R is actual holdings of reserves minus gold, valued in millions of U.S. dollars and deflated 
by the U.S. GDP deflator (P), pop is the total population of the country, gpc is real GDP per 
capita, exa is the volatility of real export receipts, imy is the share of imports of goods and 
services in GDP, and neer is the volatility of the nominal effective exchange rate. 
Real reserve holdings should increase with the size of international transactions, so we 
would expect reserve holdings to be positively correlated with the country’s population and 
standard of living.  Reserve holdings should increase with the volatility of international receipts 
and payments if they are intended to help cushion the economy, so we would expect reserve 
holdings to be positively correlated with the volatility of a country’s export receipts.  Reserve 
holdings should also increase with the vulnerability to external shocks.  We therefore expect 
reserve holdings to be positively correlated with the average propensity to import, a measure of 
the economy’s openness and vulnerability to external shocks.  Finally, since greater exchange-
rate flexibility should reduce the demand for reserves because central banks no longer need a 7 
large reserve stockpile to manage a fixed exchange rate, reserve holdings should be negatively 
correlated with exchange-rate volatility.
5 
Table 1 presents two regressions for a panel consisting of 122 developing countries over 
the 1980-96 period.
6  Regression (1) confirms our priors.  The scale variables, population size 
and real GDP per capita, are positive and highly significant.  The volatility of real export receipts 
and the vulnerability to external shocks measured by openness are also positive and highly 
significant. Greater exchange-rate variability significantly reduces reserve holdings.  These five 
variables account for 88 percent of the variation in actual reserve holdings when country fixed 
effects are included; they account for over 70 percent of the variation without the fixed effects. 
Regression (2) in Table 1 adds some political measures to the explanatory variables used 
in regression (1).  Aizenman and Marion (2002) show that political uncertainty and political 
corruption each act as a tax on the return to reserves and hence reduce optimal holdings.  
Regression (2) illustrates this point for a smaller sample of countries for which we have political 
measures.  An increase in an index of political corruption (corrupt) significantly reduces reserve 
holdings, as does an increase in the probability of a government leadership change by 
constitutional means (pol). 
Figures 8-10 use Regression (1), the estimation without political variables, to illustrate 
how well the regression does in predicting reserve holdings for various geographical regions and 
for specific emerging markets.  To obtain the figures, we first compute the average (non-
                                                 
5 In theory, reserve holdings should also be negatively correlated with the opportunity cost of 
holding them.  The opportunity cost is often measured by the spread between the country’s own 
bond yield and the return on U.S. Treasury bills.  Previous studies have found that it is not a 
significant explanatory factor.  (See Flood and Marion (2002) and the references cited there.)  
Moreover, interest-rate data have not been available for many developing countries until quite 
recently. 
 
6 See the data appendix for details about the regression variables and country sample.  8 
weighted) value of the coefficients on the country dummies.  The average coefficient value is –
0.2573.  We then compute one, two and three standard deviations around this average.  These 
values are shown as gridlines in the figures. Finally, we compute the average value of the 
coefficients on country dummies for various geographical regions of the world, using the IMF’s 
regional classification, and we also plot the coefficient on the country dummy for specific 
emerging markets of interest.  
An examination of Figure 8 shows that when we estimate reserve holdings without 
explanatory political variables, our predictions for the broad regions of Asia, Latin America and 
Africa are quite good.  The average values of the coefficients for these regions are close to the 
sample average.  However, for the smaller sample of Far East emerging markets (China, 
Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand) and  Latin American emerging markets 
(Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela), average 
coefficient values are considerably more negative than the sample average.  Consequently, the 
regression’s explanatory variables over-predict reserve holdings for these subsets of countries in 
the 1980-96 period.   
Figures 9 and 10 illustrate the extent of over-prediction for each of the countries in these 
two regions.  In the Far East, the coefficient on China’s dummy is two standard deviations below 
the average, while the coefficients on Indonesia, Korea, the Philippines and Thailand are all 
below the average by at least one standard deviation.  In Latin America, no country has a 
coefficient more than two standard deviations below the average, but Brazil comes close. 
Figures 11-13 repeat the exercise for estimates derived from Regression (2), the one that 
includes political variables.  In Figure 11 we see that the average values of the dummy 
coefficients for Latin America and Africa are close to the sample average of 0.102, but the value 9 
for the Asian developing countries is more than one standard deviation below the sample 
average. The regression consequently has a tendency to over-predict reserve holdings for the 
Asian region.  Looking at specific countries in Figures 12-13, we see that the coefficient on the 
country dummy is more than two standard deviations below the average for Korea and Brazil, 
again suggesting that the explanatory variables inclusive of political factors are over-predicting 
reserve holdings for these important emerging markets. 
Figure 14 shows the deviation of each country’s dummy coefficient from the sample 
average for both regression (1) and (2).  One can see specific outliers, both positive and negative.  
For example, when political variables are considered, the biggest negative outliers are Brazil, 
Cote d’Ivoire, South Korea and South Africa.  The dummy coefficients for these countries are 
more than two standard deviations below the average.  China and Mexico have dummy 
coefficients more than one standard deviation below the average.  
We now use data for 1997-1999 to check how well our two regressions predict out-of-
sample for the Asian emerging markets.
7  Table 2 displays the results. 
For Korea, the regression that includes the political variables continues to over-predict 
reserve holdings for 1997, the year of Korea’s financial crisis.  However, the regression 
dramatically under-predicts Korea’s reserve holdings in both 1998 and 1999.  The estimation 
under-predicts Korea’s reserve holdings by $14.6 billion in 1998 and by $25.8 billion in 1999.  If 
we had used the regression excluding political variables, the under-prediction in reserve holdings 
                                                 
7 We do not have corruption and political instability data for the 1997-99 period, but since these 
data change slowly, if at all, over the 1990s, we just extrapolate forward using the political data 
from 1996. 
 10 
by 1999 would have been $41.1 billion!
8  These findings suggest that the 1997-98 Asian 
financial crisis increased Korea’s optimal long-run demand for reserves.
9  With limited access to 
global capital markets following the crisis, Korea could not immediately adjust its stock to the 
higher optimal level.
10 
For the other emerging Asian economies, the gap between the actual and predicted value 
of reserves over the 1997-99 period is less dramatic.  In the case of China, the regression with 
political variables included under-predicts China’s reserve holdings in real terms in 1997 and 
1998 by $12 billion and $11.4 billion, respectively, while it over-predicts China’s reserve 
holdings in 1999 by $12.3 billion.  (Without including political variables, the under-prediction in 
1998 would have been $20.4 billion.)   Including the political variables, the estimation under-
predicts Thailand’s reserve holdings in all three years, 1997-1999, with the greatest under-
prediction being $10 billion in real terms in 1999.  The estimation under-predicts Philippine 
reserve holdings in all three years as well, with the 1999 under-prediction being the largest, at 
$6.9 billion.  Interestingly, the estimation over-predicts Malaysian reserve holdings in all three 
years, with the largest over-prediction being $16 billion in crisis year 1997.  The Malaysian 
results suggest a possible trade off between the willingness to adopt capital controls and the 
willingness to hold international reserves.  Because Malaysia chose to impose capital controls 
                                                 
8 These prediction errors are expressed in real terms.  If there were no prediction errors on price 
deflators, the under-prediction of Korean reserves would be $15.3 billion in nominal terms in 
1998 and $27.5 billion in 1999.  Excluding political factors, the under-prediction would have 
been $43.8 billion in nominal terms in 1999. 
 
9 In the next section, we examine several reasons for the increase in optimal reserve holdings.  
 
10 Evaluating empirically the impact of access to global capital markets on the demand for 
international reserves may be subject to a “peso problem” -- access matters most when a crisis 
hits.  A regression using data with infrequent or shallow crises will under-estimate the increase in 
reserve demand following a severe crisis.  
 11 
during the financial crisis, it reduced its effective integration with the global capital markets and 
its demand for international reserves.
 11 
The observation that a standard estimating equation over-predicted reserve holdings in 
the Far East in the 1980-1996 period but mostly under-predicts holdings in the more recent 
period suggests that behavior has changed since the Asian financial crisis. In the next section, we 




4.  Some Reasons for Large Reserve Holdings 
The recent build-up of large international reserve holdings in a number of Asian 
emerging markets may represent precautionary holdings.  While these holdings are undoubtedly 
motivated by many factors, we focus on two.  The first is the need to smooth consumption and 
distortions intertemporally in the face of conditional access to global capital markets and costly 
domestic tax collection. The second is an increase in the volatility of shocks and/or loss aversion 
after the 1997-98 Asian financial crisis.  Since these motivating factors could induce all 
emerging markets to hold large precautionary balances, why is it that some do not?  We show 
that countries with relatively high discount rates, political instability, or political corruption find 
it optimal to hold less precautionary reserves. 
We now examine in turn the roles of conditional access to global capital markets and loss 
aversion. 
                                                 
11 The regression with political variables included also under-predicts out-of-sample for some 
emerging markets in Latin America.  For example, it under-predicts Brazil’s reserve holdings by 
$23.1 billion, $16.7 billion and $11.7 billion in years 1997-99, respectively, and under-predicts 
Mexico’s reserve holdings by $8.4 billion, $9.7 billion and $8.8 billion in those same years.  The 
regression does better out-of-sample for Chile, over-predicting its reserve holdings by a mere 
$0.5 to $3 billion.  12 
a.  Conditional access to global capital markets 
 
The demand for international reserves is frequently analyzed in terms of a buffer stock 
model.  That model suggests central banks should choose a level of reserves to balance the 
macroeconomic adjustment costs incurred in the absence of reserves with the opportunity cost of 
holding reserves.  An alternative strategy is to view international reserve holdings as a form of 
precautionary saving for economies with conditional access to global capital markets and costly 
domestic tax collection.  Even if consumers are risk neutral, these considerations can be 
important enough to generate a positive and potentially large stockpile of international reserves.  
Formally, both costly taxation and imperfect integration with the global capital market due to 
sovereign risk generate non-linearities that make precautionary balances welfare-improving.  
To simplify our example, we assume agents are risk neutral.  (Recall that risk-neutral 
agents choose no precautionary saving in the conventional analysis.)  Focusing on risk neutrality 
allows us to isolate the effects of non-linearities introduced by imperfect capital markets and 
costly taxation.    
We study a two-period, two-states-of-nature model of an emerging-market economy.  
The economy is subject to productivity shocks that create a volatile tax base.  It faces inelastic 
fiscal outlays and finds it costly to collect taxes.   The economy can borrow internationally in the 
first period, but because there is some chance it will default in the second period, it faces a credit 
ceiling.
12   
The central bank actively targets the stock of reserves.  Even so, a variety of exchange-
rate arrangements are possible, such as a fixed exchange rate or a managed float, because the 
                                                 
12 A detailed model along these lines is described in Aizenman and Marion (2002).  The model 
described here is a simplified version of that model.  
 13 
balance sheets of the central bank and treasury are consolidated and the net taxes paid by 
consumers are determined as a residual.
13    
Suppose e  is a productivity shock that occurs only in the second period.  Then GDP in 
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The emerging market can borrow in international capital markets.  It borrows  B in period 
1 at a contractual rate  r and owes (1+r)B in period 2.  If it faces a bad enough productivity 
shock in the second period, it defaults.  Default is not without penalty, however.  International 
creditors can confiscate some of the emerging market’s export revenues or other resources equal 
to a share a of its output.  The more open the economy, the greater a is likely to be.  We assume 
that the defaulting country’s international reserve holdings are beyond the reach of creditors.
14  
In the second period, the country repays its international obligations if repayment is less 
costly than the default penalty.  The country ends up transferring S2 real resources to 
international creditors in the second period, where: 
 
(3)        [ ] 2 2 ; ) 1 ( Y B r MIN S a + =  ,                    1 0 < <a  
                                                 
13 This structure would also apply to the operation of export stabilization funds, such as Chile’s 
cooper fund. 
 
14 This is a realistic assumption.  For example, on January 5, 2002, The Economist reported 
“[President Duhalde] confirmed that Argentina will formally default on its debt, an overdue 
admission of an inescapable reality.  The government has not had access to international credit 
(except from the IMF) since July.  It had already repatriated nearly all of its liquid foreign assets 
to avoid their seizure by creditors.” (The Economist, p. 29) 
 14 
Suppose the risk-free interest rate is  rf .  The interest rate attached to the country’s 
acquired debt,  r, is determined by the condition that the expected return on the debt is equal to 
the risk-free return: 
 
(4)           E[S2] = (1+rf)B 
 
Applying the above assumptions and recognizing that  E[S2]=0.5(1-e)a+0.5(1+r)B, we infer 
that the supply of fund facing the economy is  








































The demand for public goods, such as health, pensions, and defense, is assumed to be 
completely inelastic and set at G .  Public goods expenditures are financed, in part, by tax 
revenues.  Collecting taxes is assumed to be costly. Costs include direct collection and 
enforcement costs as well as indirect deadweight losses associated with the distortions induced 
by taxes.  Like Barro (1979), we model these costs as a non-linear share of output and let them 
depend positively on the tax rate.  Thus, a tax at rate t yields net tax revenue of 
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The term 
2 5 . 0 t l  measures the fraction of output lost because of inefficiencies in the tax 
collection system.   For a given net tax revenue  2 , 1 ; = i Ti , the needed tax rate is 
 15 
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i x  denotes the effective tax rate from the consumers’ point of view. 
The government can acquire international reserves in the first period, let them earn the 
risk-free rate, and spend them in the second period.  One way of acquiring reserves is through 
sovereign borrowing. Even if reserves are acquired as the counterpart of private-sector 
borrowing, full sterilization by the central bank implies an ultimate swap of sovereign debt for 
reserves.  Another way of accumulating reserves is through taxation.  Higher taxes depress 
domestic absorption and generate a bigger current-account surplus in the first period.  In the 
second period, reserves may be spent to finance repayment of the international debt and 
government expenditures. In a two-period model, there is no need to hold reserves beyond the 
second period.  Thus the terminal demand for reserves is zero. 
The government faces the following budget constraints: 
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where  l h T T , 2 , 2 ;  correspond to net taxes in the second period when output is high and low, 
respectively.  In the first period, taxes and foreign borrowing must finance spending on public 
goods and reserve accumulation.  In the second period, spending on public goods and debt 
repayments must be financed by taxes and available reserves.   
We now wish to evaluate the optimal foreign borrowing and demand for international 
reserves by a country with a costly tax collection system and some chance of defaulting.  Subject 16 
to the government budget constraints in (8), the policy maker chooses the foreign debt and 
international reserves to acquire in the first period in order to maximize the intertemporal utility 
of risk-neutral consumers:  
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where  r is the discount rate.  Consumer spending in each period is merely output net of taxes, 
where taxes include collection costs.  Applying (8), the effective tax rate facing consumers in 
each period is:      
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Suppose that external borrowing occurs in the range where sovereign risk applies.  (Our 
solution will later identify this range.)  The first-order condition that determines optimal 
borrowing is: 
 























Note that (7) implies that the marginal cost of public funds (the drop in disposable income 
needed to increase net taxes by one dollar) is
15 
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Applying (11) and (12), we infer that optimal borrowing equates the expected second-period 
marginal cost of public funds evaluated over the distribution of shocks that induce full repayment 
to the cost of public funds in the first period.  Condition (11) implies that external borrowing 
alone is insufficient for achieving intertemporal smoothing of the tax burden in all states of 
nature.  If a bad enough shock reduces future output so much that the country defaults, then the 
absence of international reserves to finance second-period public expenditures implies the 
country must raise taxes to finance them. 
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Reserves are chosen optimally to equate the expected present value of the marginal cost of public 
funds in the two periods.  They permit expected smoothing of the tax burden over time.   
Applying (11) and (13) we find 
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The combination of optimal borrowing and optimal reserve holdings equalizes the cost of public 
funds across the future two states of nature. [See (14).]  The gap between the subjective time 18 
preference and the risk free interest rate determines the intertemporal profile of the costs of 
public funds.  The greater the bias towards present consumption, the greater the bias towards 
lower present tax rates. This bias, in turn, increases borrowing (B) and reduces saving (R). 
A useful benchmark case is one where the intertemporal bias is zero ( r = f r ).  In this 
case, the tax rate is equalized across time and across the two future states of nature.  Applying 
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The result in (16) yields several insights.  First, the demand for reserves and external 
borrowing each depend linearly on the size of fiscal commitments and on a measure of openness 
( a , G , respectively).  They also depend on the variability of shocks (e ).  This result contrasts 
with a conventional precautionary demand that depends on the square of the variation.  Hence, 
the size of precautionary reserve holdings in our example is potentially large.  If  G  is interpreted 
to include the now explicit government liabilities to banks and other institutions in the aftermath 
of a financial crisis, then the demand for reserves after a crisis could be quite large. 
A second insight is that the net borrowing position, B – R, increases with the bias towards 
present consumption,  f r - r .
16  This result is illustrated in Figure 15, where a simulation traces 
the dependence of optimal borrowing and international reserves on the subjective discount rate.  
A greater bias towards early consumption tilts the tax rate towards the future.  To satisfy the 
                                                 
16 For the case where the risk-free interest rate is zero, the condition for having an internal 
solution with a partial default is that the government expenditure not be ‘too large’-- G > a .  A 
large enough fiscal demand would induce a corner solution where borrowing is at the credit 
ceiling. 19 
budget constraints, international reserve holdings must fall and external borrowing must rise, 
increasing the country’s net borrowing position.   
Third, the result that choosing reserve holdings and external borrowing optimally 
accomplishes tax smoothing between various states is the outcome of having only three states of 
nature -- one realization of first-period output and two possible realizations of the second-period 
output.  If there were more than three state of nature but no additional financial instruments, 
complete tax smoothing could not occur. Yet even in that environment, holding international 
reserves as well as external debt would allow better tax smoothing because it would smooth the 
expected tax burden across periods. 
In Aizenman and Marion (2002), we examine the contribution of reserves and external 
debt to tax smoothing for the case where the second-period productivity shock has a continuous 
distribution and agents may be risk averse.  We also show that political uncertainty and political 
corruption each tax the return on reserves, reducing optimal reserve holdings and increasing 
external borrowing.  In our simplified example here, the effect of increasing the bias toward 
present consumption is very similar to the effect of political uncertainty or corruption.  As shown 
in Figure 1, it increases the net borrowing position, B – R.  The bias towards present 
consumption, like political uncertainty or corruption, may cause some countries to hold fewer 
precautionary reserve balances than would otherwise be the case. 
Fourth, the results are the outcome of two features interacting with each other, 
conditional access to the global capital markets induced by sovereign risk and costly taxes.  It is 
easy to verify that we need both features to obtain a meaningful demand for reserves and external 
borrowing.  If the probability of default is zero or if taxes are lump sum, the solution identifies 
only the net debt, B – R, because borrowing and reserve depletion are perfect substitutes.   20 
b.  Loss aversion 
  Loss aversion is the tendency of agents to be more sensitive to reductions in their 
consumption than to increases, relative to some reference point.  It is modeled using a 
generalized expected utility framework that attaches bigger weights to ‘bad’ states of nature and 
smaller ones to ‘good’ states than in the conventional expected utility set up.  Loss aversion has 
important implications for the size and the benefits of buffer stocks.  An optimizing policy 
authority may choose a small buffer stock if it is maximizing the expected utility of agents with 
conventional preferences.  It will choose a much larger buffer stock if it is maximizing the utility 
of loss-averse agents.  [See Aizenman (1998).] Consequently, our focus on a non-linearity in 
preferences induced by loss aversion complements our previous examination of conditional 
access to global capital markets and costly tax collection, where different non-linearities 
generated a demand for precautionary reserve holdings. 
Even though loss aversion provides an incentive for holding substantial international 
reserves, critics argue that large reserve holdings waste resources.  The opportunity cost of 
holding reserves in safe, low-return assets is not having those funds channeled to capital 
formation, a higher return activity.
17  We evaluate this criticism and show that even when there is 
a sizeable equity premium, such that the return on domestic capital far exceeds the return on the 
safe asset, it can still be optimal to hold large reserve balances if agents are loss-averse.  We 
illustrate the point using a simple two-period example. 
Consider the case where initial income, Z, is allocated across international reserves (R), 
investment in tangible capital (I), and consumption (C).  International reserves earn a relatively 
low but risk-free real interest rate,  f r .  Their opportunity cost is the forgone return on risky 
                                                 
17 One rebuttal has been to suggest that some fraction of a country’s reserves could be held in 
riskier, higher-return assets.  See Feldstein (2002). 21 
domestic capital.  The intertemporal budget constraints imply that consumption in periods 1 and 
2 are:  
 
(17)   
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where  ) 1 )( ( e + + I K f  is a neoclassical production function, K is the initial stock of capital, and 
e  is a second-period productivity shock.  Note that reserves boost consumption in the second 
period. 
To simplify, suppose there are only two future states of nature.  There is an equal chance 
of the productivity shock being good or bad: 
 

















Private agents choose a level of domestic investment spending and the policy authority 
chooses a stock of international reserves to maximize the utility (V) of loss-averse agents: 
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In (19), the extent of loss aversion is captured by the extra weight (q ) attached to the bad 
state of nature in the utility function (V ).  The loss aversion ratio is the marginal utility of a loss 
relative to the marginal utility of a gain.  It is equal to  ) 1 /( ) 1 ( q q - + .  The ratio measures the 
tendency of agents to be more sensitive to reductions in their utility than to increases.  [See 
Tversky and Kahneman (1991) and Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler (1990)].  The ratio has a 
value of one in the conventional utility framework where agents assign no extra weight to bad 
outcomes, but it exceeds one for agents exhibiting first-order loss aversion.  Empirical estimates 
of the loss-aversion ratio are typically in the neighborhood of 2 (corresponding to a weight of 
3 / 1 = q ).   
  The marginal product of capital, which is also the opportunity cost of holding reserves, is 
obtained from one of the first-order conditions of the optimization problem.  Loss-averse agents 
choose their optimal investment spending level when R = 0 in order to maximize their utility:    
 







The corresponding first-order condition can be reduced to  
  (21)  MU1 =
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is capital’s marginal product.  
The utility gain associated with acquiring the first unit of international reserves is: 
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The demand for international reserves is positive if obtaining a unit of reserves increases utility.  
Applying (21) to (22), we infer that the demand for international reserves is positive iff 
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Suppose that the productivity shock (d) is small.  Then a first-order approximation of second-
period marginal utility as a function of d gives 
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Applying (24) to (23) and collecting terms, we find that a first-order approximation of the 
marginal gain from accumulating reserves around R = 0 is 
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+ - = f .  The term k  denotes the equity premium, while 
f  is the coefficient of relative risk aversion.   
Examination of (25) shows that if agents have the conventional expected utility ( 0 = q ), there is 
no demand for international reserves when the equity premium is positive.
18  When agents are 
                                                 
18 This follows from the fact that  { } k q sign
R
V
sign R - @
¶
¶
= = 0 ; 0 | . One must qualify this statement 
somewhat because (25) is a first-order approximation.  The more precise statement is to say that 
the gain from obtaining reserves when q = 0 is of a second-order magnitude, proportional to 
2 d .  24 
loss-averse, having reserves reduces losses in bad states.  Reserves generate extra gains 
proportional to q d, where q  is the aversion to downside loss and d is the variation of shocks.  If 
the product q d is large enough, the demand for international reserves is positive.
19  Thus a 
policy authority maximizing the expected utility of loss-averse agents may find it optimal to hold 
sizeable international reserves even if the equity premium is significantly positive. 
In these circumstances, the optimal demand for reserves is determined by solving 
simultaneously 
 












Optimal reserve holdings will be proportional to qd as well.  Consequently, an increase in loss 
aversion (q) and/or an increase in the volatility of shocks (d) increases precautionary reserves.   
 
 
5.  Conclusion 
A standard estimating equation that focuses on a parsimonious set of explanatory factors 
does a good job in explaining central bank reserve holdings of developing countries through 
1996, but it under-predicts reserve holdings of countries in the Far East after that.  Undoubtedly, 
the recent large build-up of international reserve holdings in the Far East is motivated by the 
experience of the recent Asian financial crisis. Countries facing increased sovereign risk and 
                                                                                                                                                              
Indeed, one can show that in these circumstances, optimal reserves are proportional to 
2 d (u”’/u’). 
 




high taxation costs associated with large inelastic fiscal liabilities find it optimal to hold a lot of 
precautionary reserve balances.  When countries attach more weight to bad outcomes than to 
good ones, they also find it optimal to hold sizeable precautionary balances of international 
reserves, even if the opportunity cost is significantly positive. Not all developing economies, 
indeed not all emerging markets, will hold large reserve stockpiles in the aftermath of crises, 
however.  Countries that strongly favor current consumption, that experience political instability, 
or suffer from political corruption face a lower effective return on holding reserves and will 
acquire more modest stockpiles. 
Our analysis highlights several new themes.  First, political-economy considerations are 
useful in improving the explanatory power of econometric models of international reserves.  
Second, the demand for international reserves by emerging markets can be explained by a 
generalized precautionary saving model, allowing for limited integration with international 
capital markets, costly tax collection, and relatively inelastic fiscal outlays. These factors explain 
the high demand for international reserves even if agents are risk neutral.  While such a model is 
a useful framework for understanding the issues involved, our paper does not provide a formal 
test of this model.  Indeed, a hybrid model combining adjustment costs and precautionary saving 
may provide a better interpretation of some of the relevant issues.  Attempts to address these 
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rmg/usp = reserves minus gold, deflated by the U.S. GDP deflator (1995=100). Source:  
International Financial Statistics (IMF) for the  reserves data and World Economic 
Outlook (IMF) for the deflator. 
 
lpop  =  total population, logged.  Source:  World Development Indicators. 
 
lgpc =     real GDP per capita, logged.  Source:  World Development Indicators. 
 
lexa  =    volatility of real export receipts, logged.  Volatility is calculated using annual data and 
is the standard error of a regression of trend real exports.  Source:  International 
Financial Statistics. 
 
limy =    the percentage share of imports in GDP, logged.  Source:  World Development 
Indicators. 
 
lneer =   volatility of the nominal effective exchange rate, logged.  Annual volatility is calculated 
using the previous 24 months of data and is the standard deviation of the innovation of 
the percentage change in the nominal effective exchange rate. Source:  Information 
System Network, IMF. 
 
corrupt = corruption index is from Tanzi and Davoodi (1997).  The index is spliced from two 
sources, Business International and International Country Risk Guide.  Business 
International asks informed correspondents to measure the degree to which business 
transactions involved corruption or questionable payments.  The index ranges from 0 
(most corrupt) to 10 (least corrupt) and is available for the 1980-1983 period.  
International Country Risk Guide asks foreign investors to assess the extent to which 
high government officials will demand special payments or illegal payments are 
expected throughout the lower levels of government in the forms of bribes connected 
with import and export licenses, exchange controls, tax assessment, police protection, 
or loans.  The index ranges from 0 (most corrupt) to 6 (least corrupt) and is available 
for the 1982-1995 period. It has been re-scaled by multiplying it by 10/6 so that both 
indexes range from 0 to 10.  Because the data change very little from year to year, 1995 
values are used for 1996 observations. For ease in interpreting results, the index has 
been multiplied by minus one so that higher values of the index imply higher 
corruption. 
  
pol  =   the probability of a leadership change by constitutional means.  Source:  LaBlang (2000). 
 
Countries: The 137 countries listed in the World Bank’s Global Development Finance. Note that 
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Figure 3: China’s Reserve Holdings 
 
 


















China: Reserves Minus Gold



























































China: Reserves Minus Gold


















China:  Reserves Minus Gold 














Taiwan: Reserves Minus Gold







































Figure 4: Taiwan’s Reserve Holdings 
 






































































Hong Kong: Reserves Minus Gold 























































































Korea: Reserves Minus Gold












































































Korea: Reserves Minus Gold 














Korea: Reserves Minus Gold 














Figure 7: Singapore’s Reserve Holdings 
Singapore:  Total Reserves 





























































































Figure 9:  Deviations in Far East Countries 


























Figure 8:  Regional Deviations  from Average Dummy Coefficient 



































Figure 10:  Deviations in Latin American Emerging Markets  





























Figure 12:  Deviations in Far East Countries  


























Figure 11: Regional Deviations from Average Dummy Coefficient  


































Figure 13:  Deviations in Latin American Emerging Markets  



























Figure 14: Deviation From Average Dummy Coefficient 
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Optimal borrowing (B) and international reserves (R) as a function of the subjective rate of time preference.  
The Figure reports the values of B and R corresponding to 







B, R 41 
Table 1:  Determinants of Reserve Holdings 
 
(1)  (2) 
 
obs  1954  915 
countries  122  65 
 
dep var  ln(R/P)  ln(R/P) 
 
lpop  2.1762**  1.6764** 
(0.4607)  (0.6124) 
 
lgpc  1.5436**  1.8111** 
(0.2878)  (0.3633) 
 
lexa  0.2512**  0.1176 
(0.1044)  (0.1456) 
 
limy  0.4954**  0.4976** 
(0.2020)  (0.2675) 
 
lneer  -0.1065**  -0.1092* 
(0.367)  (0.0613) 
 
corrupt     ---  -0.1283** 
    (0.0442) 
 
pol     ---  -0.2904** 




  0.88  0.88 
 
 
Standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation.  All regressions include 
fixed country  effects.  Constant terms not reported.   
 
‘**’ (‘*’) indicates statistical significance at the 5 percent (10 percent) level. 
 
Sample based on annual data over the 1980-1996 period for 137 developing countries listed in 
the World Bank’s Global Development Finance.  Sample size reduced because of data 
availability. Dependent variable is reserves minus gold in US$ deflated by the US GDP deflator, 
logged.  Explanatory variables are total population (logged), real GDP per capita (logged), the 
volatility of real export receipts (logged), imports of goods and services as a share of GDP 
(logged), the volatility of the nominal effective exchange rate (logged), an index of political 
corruption (scale 0-10, with 10 being the most corrupt), and the probability of government 
change by constitutional means.Table 2:  Out-of Sample Forecast Error 
 
  actual rmg/usp  predicted rmg/usp  actual-predicted  error 
KOREA  ($bil)   ($bil)   ($bil)    
97  19.60519043  41.2493085  -21.64411807  overpredicts 
98  49.39624203  34.82217335  14.57406868  underpredicts 
99  69.35403645  43.58418473  25.76985171  underpredicts 
         
CHINA, Mainland         
97  137.4162099  125.3781473  12.03806263  underpredicts 
98  141.7867756  130.360586  11.42618965  underpredicts 
99  147.8509023  160.1922008  -12.34129846  overpredicts 
         
THAILAND         
97  25.19950494  24.01609784  1.183407094  underpredicts 
98  27.39455714  18.94962892  8.444928222  underpredicts 
99  31.92994707  21.88571956  10.04422751  underpredicts 
         
         
PHILIPPINES         
97  6.994291729  6.404522293  0.589769436  underpredicts 
98  8.767698551  5.851888028  2.915810523  underpredicts 
99  12.40158577  5.534185213  6.867400556  underpredicts 
         
MALAYSIA         
97  20.01004403  36.01171669  -16.00167266  overpredicts 
98  24.29096205  31.21548697  -6.924524925  overpredicts 
99  28.67295514  36.28826276  -7.615307615  overpredicts 
 
 
 